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The aim of this paper is to provide better support for the 
development of secure systems. We argue that current 
development practice suffers from two key problems: 
1. Security requirements tend to be kept separate from 
other system requirements, and not integrated into any 
overall strategy. 
2. The impact of security measures on users and the 
operational cost of these measures on a day-to-day 
basis are usually not considered. 
Our new paradigm is the full integration of security and usability 
concerns into the software development process, thus enabling 
developers to build secure systems that work in the real world.  
We present AEGIS, a secure software engineering method which 
integrates asset identification, risk and threat analysis and context 
of use, bound together through the use of UML, and report its 
application to case studies on Grid projects.  An additional benefit 
of the method is that the involvement of stakeholders in the high-
level security analysis improves their understanding of security, 
and increases their motivation to comply with policies.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
“Effective security is at odds with convenience” [14]. This 
statement reflects a common point of view among security experts 
and software providers. The effectiveness of a security 
mechanism, however, depends on both users and technology 
“doing the right thing”. The usability of security mechanisms is 
not just a question of improving interfaces to security tools, but 
designing security to work with the real-world tasks users 
perform, and within the physical and social context of that 
interaction [18]. 
Recent research on usability and security has focussed on user 
problems and needs (e.g. [6], [20], [21]). There is compelling 
evidence that system developers deserve at least as much 
attention. According to CERT [1], the number of security 
vulnerabilities in systems is increasing rapidly (from 2437 in 2001 
to 4129 in 2002). A recent survey [4] of similar products from 
different providers found that the least secure product carried a 6 
times higher business risk than the most secure one, highlighting 
the fact that the security quality of a product can vary drastically 
depending on who designed and implemented it. 
It is self-evident that developers play a key role in the provision 
of usable and effective security. But to make the right decisions 
during the design and implementation process, developers need a 
development method that helps them to identify and represent 
security and usability requirements in the design from the outset. 
Such a method must be lightweight, compatible with notations 
and tools already in use, and lead to secure systems that work in 
practice. To answer this need, we have developed AEGIS 
(Appropriate and Effective Guidance for Information Security), a 
secure software engineering method that integrates security 
requirements elicitation, risk analysis and context of use, bound 
together through the use of UML. 
In section 2, we discuss in detail what type of support software 
developers need to build secure systems. In section 3, we present 
the detailed stages of AEGIS, and in section 4 we report on case 
studies where AEGIS has been applied. 
2. ISSUES IN DEVELOPING SECURE 
SOFTWARE 
Since the advent of the software engineering process, developers 
have been required to balance a number of requirements in 
building systems (e.g. functionality, efficiency, time-to-market, 
modularity, scalability, extensibility). Over the past few years, the 
rapid evolution of wide area networked systems has created 
additional security concerns. Recent research on usability of 
security points out that systems must be designed to make it easy 
for intended users to “do the right thing” when it comes to 
security [12]. The number and complexity of issues that 
developers of secure systems have to consider has increased such 
that many find it difficult to cope. Following good software 
engineering practices is, in many cases, not enough. 
Building secure systems necessitates:   
1. Following a systematic process of software engineering. 
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2. Carrying out a risk assessment on which to base 
security decisions [10], [19]. 
3. Up-to-date knowledge of security threats and 
countermeasures. 
4. Devising security mechanisms that are effective in the 
real world, i.e. that are usable by the intended users in 
their specific context of use [18].  
The problem is that existing design methods for secure systems do 
not address all of these goals and do not provide enough support 
for the developers to realistically achieve them. 
One method that does address all principles is the one by Abrams 
[5], which aims to integrate security engineering into the 
evolutionary acquisition process. The method follows a 
prototyping and pragmatic risk-based security design approach. It 
also relies on regular input from various stakeholders such as 
users and developers, as well as an understanding of the context 
in which the system operates. 
Although we agree with the principles of this approach 
(contextual information about the system, integration into a 
software engineering strategy, risk-based security decisions), we 
believe that it fails to provide sufficient support for developers. 
1. There is no integration with the system design 
documents: the results are presented in a security 
specification in a separate document, and in a different 
notation. This is more than a mere inconvenience: 
having a separate specification document means 
security requirements are usually “out of sight” when 
design decisions are made. 
2. The context in which the system operates is not part of 
the documentation used throughout the design process. 
The system context is reviewed at the 
beginning of each new iteration of the 
prototype, as opposed to being visible 
throughout the whole process. 
3. Although the design process provides a 
placeholder for risk-driven security design, 
there is no particular guidance as to what 
factors to take into account when making 
such decisions – especially social and 
cultural factors. 
We introduce a method that builds on [5], but which 
can support developers in building effective and 
usable security throughout the design process, and is 
fully integrated with the existing software 
engineering tools and notations. 
Appropriate and Effective Guidance in Information 
Security (AEGIS) uses context regeneration (based 
on contextual design [9]) and risk analysis as tools to 
assist developers in representing and addressing 
security and usability requirements in system design. 
By involving stakeholders in the high-level risk 
analysis and selection of countermeasures, their 
understanding of the need for security 
countermeasures, and their motivation to contribute 
to security are likely to be improved [10], [19]. 
Finally, by using UML, AEGIS provides a uniform basis on 
which to discuss and bind the separate areas of usability, risk 
management and technical design. 
Grid computing 
We are currently applying AEGIS to the analysis and design of a 
number of Grid projects. The purpose of Grids, such as 
Seti@Home [3], is to use the Internet as an infrastructure for 
distributed computing. Computing power, storage or results can 
all be shared across Grids, lowering the cost of research. In areas 
of research that require very large investment (physics, medicine, 
astronomy, etc.), the advantages of sharing data and resources are 
very attractive. Whereas current computing power can only be 
upgraded through the purchase of expensive machinery, Grids 
allow completely different concepts  of operation to be supported, 
such as the remote use of another institution’s specialised 
facilities (e.g. supercomputers, a specific observatory, a 
specialised laboratory, etc.). 
This has led to a number of projects being started to investigate 
and create the necessary technology to make Grids a reality. 
Because of the nature of Grids and the number of different 
environments they aim to operate in, however, there exist a large 
number of threats, many of which are not considered in standard 
security analyses. This makes the need for security in these 
projects paramount to the future success of Grids. 
3. AEGIS 
AEGIS is a software engineering method for creating secure 
systems based on security requirements identification through 
asset modelling, risk analysis and context of use.  
Based on the spiral model of software development – as seen in 
Figure 1 (inspired from [19] and [11]) – AEGIS integrates 
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Figure 1. AEGIS Spiral Model of Software Development 
security and usability with the prevailing modelling technique 
UML. This ensures that usability, thanks to contextual 
regeneration (inspired from the same technique that Zurko et al. 
[22] used to successfully design a secure and usable authorisation 
system), and security are visible throughout the process.  
Evidence from the case studies we have conducted so far suggests 
that AEGIS can take place over a series of four design sessions 
between developers and stakeholders. Depending on the level of 
security needed and experience of the developers, security experts 
should be included to assist with identification of threats and 
selection/design of countermeasures. 
As part of our ongoing review of AEGIS, we are envisaging more 
detailed support in the form of checklists/FAQs to address known 
security pitfalls, and to help identify appropriate security 
mechanisms for specific contexts of use. In the long term, links to 
appropriate security patterns [2] should also be added. 
3.1 Participants 
AEGIS is conducted with three different types of participants: 
1. Facilitators 
2. Stakeholders (owners, developers, users) 
3. Security Experts 
Facilitators are in charge of conducting AEGIS. They are 
necessary to keep the design sessions on track and to elicit 
and document the security requirements. 
Stakeholders consist of developers, users and owners. It is 
important to have a variety of stakeholders (i.e. 
owners/management and all groups of users should be 
represented), although for practical purposes the number of 
participants in the meetings is best kept to 5-6. The reason 
for involving both owners and users is to ensure that: 
1. all contexts in which the system is used are 
represented, and  
2. owners and users become aware of each others’ 
goals and needs.  
Today, many systems are built to minimise the need for 
geographic closeness in cooperation – Grid systems being an 
example. Whilst these systems can offer many benefits, 
communication between different stakeholders is limited to 
occasional meetings.  In the absence of day-to-day 
communication, the number of implicit assumptions made – 
e.g. what others are trying to achieve, and how they work – 
increase.  Another prominent phenomenon we have 
encountered is what social psychologists call diffusion of 
responsibility: the notion that it is tempting to assume that 
someone else will take care of a particular problem [13]. To 
counter these tendencies, better education [20] and 
motivation [20] are key factors; getting stakeholders together 
provides the basis for improving the motivation to behave 
securely, and the knowledge of how to do this. 
Security Experts must be involved if neither Facilitators nor 
stakeholders have any technical security knowledge. Expert 
knowledge is best used, however, in the Risk analysis and 
security design phase. 
 
3.2 Identifying Assets and Security 
Requirements 
The foundation of AEGIS is to base every security decision on 
knowledge of the assets in the system. Inspired by the work of  
Herrmann et al. [15], we use UML syntax to model the system, its 
assets, threats and security controls. Figure 2 shows a relationship 
diagram of the assets in a system. 
During the first design session, the facilitators help stakeholders 
build a model of the system, representing various assets and their 
relationships. 
Facilitators ask participants to state the raison d’être of the 
system: who is involved, what is to be achieved, and how; 
anything that contributes to achieving the goal is represented as 
an asset.  Facilitators must pay particular attention to ensuring 
that the context in which people are interacting with the system is 
represented. This includes the physical and cultural environment, 
the particular roles that people must assume and the tasks they 
must carry out [9].  
Using the model of the assets, security requirements are then 
gathered from the stakeholders through scenarios where particular 
properties of the security of an asset are compromised. For 
example, a requirement for the integrity of a database can be 
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elicited by asking what would happen if the database were 
corrupted or intentionally (maliciously or not) modified. It is 
important to record these scenarios for future use and checking. 
This can be done by modelling them as abuse cases [16] – use 
cases of undesirable events. 
For example, Figure 4 shows a model generated in a case study. 
3.3 Risk Analysis and Security Design 
The second design session focuses on clarifying the asset model 
of the system and the security requirements. Dependencies 
between the assets of the system must also be identified. 
Based on the information gathered in the asset model and the 
security requirements, the third session is spent identifying the 
risks, vulnerabilities and threats to the system, and the fourth 
session selects or designs the appropriate countermeasures. Figure 
3 shows the process of risk analysis and security design. 
For the risk analysis and security design part of the process, it is 
important to ensure that expert knowledge is available in order to 
identify risks and countermeasures. AEGIS recommends using a 
lightweight risk analysis method that allows the rapid assessment 
of human and technical risks and threats, and focuses on building 
the system. It is possible, however, to employ more time-
consuming, exhaustive and quantitative methods should it be 
appropriate for the project. 
 
1. Determine vulnerabilities 
A vulnerability is an area which is susceptible to undesirable 
action. There are many kinds of vulnerabilities, which can be 
broadly divided into two categories: technical vulnerabilities and 
social vulnerabilities. Technical vulnerabilities can include buffer 
overflows, protocol timing attacks, message replays, unsecured 
access points and so on. Social vulnerabilities consists of people 
making mistakes on security administration (forgetting to backup 
their files, not rescinding access privileges, leaving computers 
unlocked, etc.), deliberately trying to subvert the system for 
malicious purposes (more commonly called social engineering. 
e.g. convincing an administrator to reset a user’s password by 
impersonating the user, getting a user to reveal their password by 
impersonating the administrator, activating the fire alarms and 
physically accessing a computer in the confusion, etc. [17]). More 
information about social vulnerabilities and a technique for 
modelling them can be found in [12].  This uses a model adapted 
from the domain of industrial safety, and distinguishes between 
active failures (at the operator level) and latent failures 
(weaknesses in the system). A security breach is a result of the 
combination of active and latent failures. Active failures are 
categorised into: 
• slips (attention failures) 
• lapses (memory failures) 
• mistakes (rule or knowledge failures) – intended actions 
that lead to unintended results 
• violations – actions that intentionally breach the 
security of the system 
Both technical and social vulnerabilities should be considered 
equally.  
 
2. Assess cost and likelihood of attack in context 
This step is necessary to establish how damaging an attack on the 
asset (utilising the vulnerability) will be, and how likely it is to 
happen in the context of use. 
John Adams states that ‘risk is subjective. It is a word that refers 
to a future that exists only in the imagination’ [8]. He also shows 
that any risk compensation affects the risk being compensated for 
and that subsequent behaviours can create different risks [7]. 
Adams illustrates this with evidence that seat-belt legislation has 
reduced the number of injuries in car passengers, but has 
increased the number of injuries to pedestrians. This is because 
seat belts provide the driver with an added sense of safety and 
their behaviour becomes less risk averse as a result. Assessing 
risk is therefore a complex endeavour which, as Blakely et al. [10] 
state would benefit from adopting a structure which allowed the 
sharing of information. 
Quantitatively evaluating risks and 
damages, such as the ALE (Annualised 
Loss Estimate – a product of the 
probability of the risk occurring and 
the financial damage it would incur 
[10]), allows an easily used and shared 
measure for risk and damages. Another 
example of a widely used quantitative 
risk measurement is the security metric 
accompanying CERT vulnerability 
disclosures [1], which is based on a 
number of factors including the impact 
of the vulnerability being exploited, the 
ease with which it can be exploited, the 
number of systems at risk, etc.  
One problem with this is that only 
easily financially estimated assets can 
make use of this. Non-tangible assets 
such as reputation, goodwill, staff 
morale, etc. cannot be assigned a 
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meaningful quantitative financial cost, and this does not take 
account of non-financially motivated attackers 
Furthermore, the usefulness of sharing quantitative ratings (such 
as the CERT security metric) – thereby reusing some of the 
acquired knowledge in the field – is currently badly affected by 
their lack of contextual information. Without this information, it 
is impossible to know whether the value has any use in a given 
environment. By modelling context as well as risk we hope to 
provide a starting point to the meaningful sharing of risk 
knowledge in computer security. 
We currently use qualitative ratings as a means of ascertaining the 
importance of a particular security requirement because the 
relative importance of different assets is often sufficient to make 
decisions in research projects such as the Grid ones. These 
generally take the form of ‘high’, ‘low’ or ‘medium’ as ratings of 
importance. Particularly important ratings are generally labelled 
as ‘essential’. In other application areas, such as the financial 
sector, quantitative ratings can also be added. 
In this step, it is important to seek accurate knowledge in order to 
achieve an informed decision and both quantitative and 
qualitative measurements should be used where most appropriate. 
Since risk is ultimately subjective, a consensus should be reached 
with security experts and stakeholders, based on available 
information – which can include existing risk assessments, field 
experience, numbers of past incidents, environment of the asset, 
dependencies between assets, etc. 
When determining the cost of a potential attack, one method of 
assessing this is to run through the security requirement document 
and confirm the ratings of importance. This information can then 
be correlated with other sources, such as legal requirements, know 
replacement costs (for replaceable assets), industry standards and 
brand impact so as to gather a good picture of the cost of an 
attack. This process is also useful to validate the initial security 
requirements and any changes should be reflected in the 
requirement documentation. 
 
3. Select countermeasures 
This section is the first stage of an iterative process of identifying 
the most cost-effective countermeasures.  
Once assets and the risks they face have been identified, the next 
step is to determine how to address these risks. From the 
information gathered thus far, a clear picture should emerge as to 
which parts of the system are most at risk, either due to a very 
high likelihood of attack, or due to the estimated crippling cost of 
a successful attack. Attention must be given to the most likely and 
damaging risks first. 
For example, all other factors being equal, it would be more 
important to secure a salary database residing on an Internet 
connected workstation (seen as high risk) than it would the same 
database on an unconnected workstation (with a lower risk from 
the internet). This does not mean that no attention should be paid 
to the second salary database, because although it has a lower 
risk, it still holds very valuable data. 
Expert advice should be used in order to identify as quickly as 
possible the most likely countermeasures. It can be proposed to 
employ: 
1. no countermeasure 
2. deterrence, prevention, detection and reaction to attacks,  
3. transfer of liability and responsibility (through 
insurance or third party intervention). 
Returning to our example, in order to secure the high-risk salary 
database some countermeasures might include disconnecting the 
workstation from the Internet and locking it in a room to which 
only two people have the key (prevention). Other alternatives 
might be to install access control and intrusion detection 
mechanisms allowing the audit of whoever accessed the machine 
(detection), making misuse a punitive offence (deterrence and 
reaction), allowing only a limited number of MAC addresses to 
connect to the machine (prevention), getting a third party to 
secure the database and maintain it’s security (transfer of 
liability), etc. 
4. Cost-benefit assessment in context 
This next stage in the countermeasure selection process 
determines what the cost of the proposed countermeasures will be, 
and weighs it against the benefits that they bring. 
Cost of countermeasures in context 
Cost in this section not only addresses financial issues, but also 
refers to the effort a user will expend in deploying the 
countermeasures. The context refers to the environment in which 
the attack can occur and in which the countermeasures are 
deployed. It is very important for the facilitator to gather 
information from the users in order to identify the projected costs 
associated with a particular countermeasure. Scenarios and use 
cases can again be used to document this activity. 
For example, if a system forces a user to change his password 
whilst he is simultaneously being urged to achieve a production 
task for which he needs the system, the cost will be very high 
both in terms of loss of productivity and in frustration of the user. 
 
Benefit of countermeasures 
Benefit in this section refers to whether the controls actually 
reduce the risk, as well as establishing whether they provide any 
advantages to the user. It is important to put the control in context 
with the other security controls as well as the rest of the system. 
Taking the previous example, the benefit of forcing a password 
change may not be particularly evident in the face of the potential 
problems. It may be that a different or additional countermeasure 
would be more beneficial. A different countermeasure - such as a 
physical authentication token - or an additional countermeasure - 
such as user training in selecting passwords - would provide 
additional benefits to the user, at the cost of greater financial 
expenditure and the potential creation of different risks (such as 
having the token stolen). 
 
5. Compare cost and likelihood of attack against cost of 
countermeasures in context 
This is the final stage in the countermeasure selection process, 
where the actual decision to adopt a countermeasure is made 
depending on its benefits versus its cost. 
Owners in the project should be involved at this stage – these 
include owners and developers. This is to establish whether the 
vulnerability poses sufficient risk and potential damage to justify 
the cost of the countermeasures. 
Thanks to the information gathered so far about the various 
countermeasures proposed, a clear picture should be evolving as 
to the impact of a particular countermeasure. If the cost proves to 
be unacceptable, or the risk still too great, the process of selecting 
countermeasures (step 3) should be started again. Otherwise, time 
and money permitting, a new cycle (step 1) should be started to 
conduct a new determination of the vulnerabilities taking the new 
countermeasures into account. If no further controls have been 
added, the assessment is over. 
 
The final output of the risk analysis and security design phase is a 
design document detailing the architecture of the system together 
with all the countermeasures which have been agreed upon 
(including training and staff motivation as well as technical 
measures), the necessary user behaviour these countermeasures 
depend on, and the workload this adds to users. In addition to this, 
the documentation generated in this process can be built upon and 
used to support future iterations. 
 
4. CASE STUDIES 
One of the projects that we have documented as a case study is 
EGSO (European Grid of Solar Observations). 
The purpose of EGSO is to provide a Grid making the solar 
observations of a number of different observatories and 
institutions available to customers. 
We evaluated AEGIS by looking at: 
1. whether developers are aware what workload the design 
imposes on users  
2. whether developers’ knowledge of security is improved, 
such as their understanding of vulnerabilities, threats, 
risks and how to address them 
3. whether developers’ and users’ awareness of, and 
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Figure 4. EGSO Asset and Security Requirement Model 
4.1 Background 
We started our case study by conducting three meetings with 
stakeholders in order to determine what the aims and 
requirements of the project were, and also to establish the current 
state of security in the project. 
We then arranged a series of design sessions with up to three 
stakeholders (two developers and one user/manager) and applied 
the AEGIS method. 
The initial review uncovered that thanks to the presence of very 
competent software engineers in the project, a high standard of 
practice was being applied to EGSO. This could be seen in 
documented use cases, requirements validation, user interface 
design and UML system design. The need for security had been 
acknowledged and some use cases, albeit in vague terms, 
described the need for some security mechanisms (e.g. the need 
for ‘direct access to satellite data in near real-time, perhaps only 
with necessary authorisation’). 
4.2 AEGIS 
In the beginning of the process, a number of previously 
undocumented security needs emerged, such as ‘users want their 
results to be protected’ and data providers need to protect their 
resources from being swamped and attacked. 
We also uncovered that ‘no one is in charge of security’. It was 
also stated that security had not been considered in depth because 
the project was ‘still in (the) early stages (of) going from 
requirements to design’. A final comment justified a lack of 
concern for security by insisting that functionality was much 
more important at this point in time, and that security would be 
addressed later. 
Evidence of diffusion of responsibility with respect to security 
was also present. Assumptions were made that other people or 
technologies would take care of some security aspects. For 
example, if digital certificates were to be used, the middleware 
would ‘take care of the PKI’ (Public Key Infrastructure). Another 
example, witnessed to a greater extent in other Grid projects, was 
the assumption that the technical support of the institutions 
hosting the projects would take care of their security. What 
happened in reality is that many institutions isolated Grid projects 
from their internal network, but did not make any further efforts 
to protect the projects. 
4.2.1 Asset Identification 
As facilitators, we started by focussing on identifying the major 
assets of EGSO. We asked our participants to draw a model of 
EGSO, and because of the distributed nature of GRID 
applications, we asked for a model that would represent every 
different kind of asset, without worrying about modelling the 
multiplicity. 
The natural inclination was to draw the system isolated from its 
environment, and we encouraged the participants to describe 
where people were involved in the system and in what kinds of 
environments various different parts of the system existed. The 
wide range of possible environments for EGSO users led us to 
refrain from modelling too much detail, although the 
commonalities of the rest of the system were identified. 
4.2.2 Security Requirements Elicitation 
Once the main assets of the system had been modelled, we set 
about identifying security requirements. We started by defining 
the concepts of confidentiality, integrity and availability (for other 
projects, different concepts might be applicable as well, such as 
dependability, accountability, non-repudiation, etc.). We then 
looked at specific assets and asked the participants to rate them 
(qualitatively) according to these three terms. More specifically, 
we asked them to evaluate what the impact would be on the 
system should a specific type of attack occur.  
For example, this is how we rated the solar data asset: 
Availability: What would happen if users were unable to access 
this information? The system needs to be ‘robust within reason’. 
Identifying levels of acceptability was ‘not something that’s been 
clearly defined.’ Availability was therefore rated as being a ‘very 
high’ requirement. 
Integrity: How important is it for the information held at the 
providers to be what users and providers expect it to be? ‘If there 
was no data, there would be no system’. Similarly, if the data was 
modified in any way so as to mislead, this would be unacceptable. 
The Integrity requirement was therefore rated as being ‘essential’. 
Confidentiality: Does the Solar Data have to be kept secret from 
anyone? ‘Some providers may want to restrict the access to the 
data for a period of time’, but ‘they may not want to use EGSO 
for that type of data’. The requirement for confidentiality was 
rated as ‘medium’. 
This proved to be useful for three reasons: 
1. Participants had to look systematically at their system 
and identify a wide range of security requirements for 
every part of the system (many people tend to forget 
that requirements other than confidentiality are also 
important). 
2. It allowed the explicit description of implicit 
assumptions, which in turn uncovered problems. 
3. The final outcome, although it consisted of qualitative 
ratings, allowed the easy identification of the most 
important assets in the system 
The full asset model, complete with the identified security 
requirements can be seen in Figure 4. 
4.2.3 Risk Analysis 
Although the risk analysis is not complete, we started by 
identifying the various dependencies between the assets of EGSO. 
This highlighted, for example, that the availability of the solar 
data (rated as very high) was completely dependent on a wide 
range of factors such as provider administrators, broker 
administrators, routing, hardware operation, network links and 
their traffic. 
Prior to carrying out the AEGIS analysis with EGSO, there had 
been a debate about whether or not to use digital certificates. The 
perceived cost and complexity of employing certification (based 
on little more than word-of-mouth) was driving the discussion, 
but the full consequences of either path of action had not been 
analysed. 
Before even starting the risk analysis, a strong desire to avoid 
having to use digital certificates was voiced, illustrating the fact 
that accurate knowledge in this area is paramount. 
During this process, we identified that some users were going to 
require a privileged access in order to be able to run resource-
consuming jobs. This conflicted with the stated desire to avoid 
having to employ a robust version of access control and 
authentication. It soon became apparent that ruling out 
certification at this stage would be premature and could possibly 
lead to a greater workload on developers and more complex 
system. 
We anticipate that the rest of the risk analysis will identify a 
number of vulnerabilities, mainly in areas of availability of 
services and integrity of data. We have already provided a 
number of scenarios in which the data that was assumed to be 
public could be modified to suit a particular attacker, or where 
user software running on provider hardware could be used to 
attack the system. 
4.2.4 Security Design 
Whilst the security design sessions are incomplete, the 
identification of the dependencies in the beginning of the risk 
analysis highlighted the total dependency on system 
administrators and prompted the need for specifying their duties. 
This in turn led to some discussions about the stated need for a 
low cost buy-in from observatories wishing to participate in the 
project, balanced against the current design requirement for their 
administrators to actively carry out various security tasks. 
Other areas were also identified where policies would have to be 
detailed, such as the expansion to different providers, data update 
and integrity control, and acceptable use. 
4.3 User issues in security decisions 
The need to document specific administrative policies has 
stemmed from explicitly stating the implied behaviours, duties 
and skill levels expected of the administrators of the system. This 
analysis has highlighted the need to detail the duties of the 
administrators in order to provide ground for both guidance and 
security. 
Issues that will be raised include the problems users can have with 
key management if the need for certification arises, the need to 
clarify the specifics of tasks that administrators must perform and 
conflicts that may occur if there is no provision for prioritising 
administrator tasks (backup, maintenance, security) and 
production tasks (special service). We will also highlight the need 
for a security culture in which secure behaviour is encouraged, 
possibly through the use of incentives and punishment for 
transgression. 
4.4 Developer knowledge of security 
Some statements uncovered during the design sessions illustrated 
a confusion and misunderstanding over what securing the project 
entailed. For example, backup needs and procedures were initially 
seen as an archival problem that should be solved by individual 
providers, even though EGSO was intended (among other things) 
to be a reliable means of access to the data. 
Other evidence of a better understanding of security can be taken 
from comments such as how this approach has raised a number of 
issues that had never been contemplated, such as the need for 
EGSO to trust providers to behave in the expected way as much 
as the need for providers to trust EGSO. Also, in the words of one 
participant (and paraphrasing an American politician), it was 
‘converting the unknown unknowns to known unknowns’. 
The process also seems to have changed the attitude of the 
stakeholders from an initially held optimistic outlook on security, 
to a more searching and deterministic attitude. 
Furthermore, developers are happy to use the process and some 
have even found it to be useful in gathering functional 
requirements and understanding the system. 
4.5 Motivation to apply security 
In this case study, even without our involvement, the motivation 
to apply security existed – what was missing was a systematic 
analysis and plan for implementing it. There was isolated 
evidence of some initial reluctance by some participants of EGSO 
to get involved because of the need to pursue functionality, but 
this quickly disappeared as soon as we started. 
Since our involvement, some of the points and suggestions that 
were made have prompted changes in the design and increased the 
resolve that security is a necessary step. 
5. SUMMARY 
These are the initial results for AEGIS and we are currently in the 
process of gathering more detailed results and transcripts from a 
number of other case studies. 
From the evidence gathered so far, AEGIS has proved to be 
approachable, engaging and simple to use. Through the 
application of AEGIS, EGSO also identified a number of 
problems and instituted a number of key changes: 
• No one was explicitly in charge of ensuring the project 
was secure 
• Little work was done to approach security 
systematically 
• There was little coordination between the project and 
the institutions that run the project regarding security 
• We identified and modelled main assets 
• We identified and documented security requirements 
• We identified many areas which forced the project to 
look at their implicit assumptions. 
• We identified the need to document policy for a large 
number of areas: backup, data update and integrity 
checking, administrator duties, expansion of EGSO to 
other providers and acceptable use 
There is evidence that this process also improved the developers’ 
and researchers’ knowledge about security. We also believe that 
the inclusion of contextual information has highlighted the need 
to document and regulate specific duties of human personnel in 
the system that other security methodologies would have 
overlooked in favour of technical issues. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Although research in the usability of security is ongoing, we 
believe there is a need to address the problems developers face 
when building secure systems. They require help to overcome the 
complexity of applying good security and designing usable 
systems at the same time. 
In response to this, we have presented AEGIS, a lightweight 
approach improving the usability of a secure development method 
as well as providing security decision makers with increased 
awareness of user context. 
Although this method is not necessarily as comprehensive in its 
technical coverage of security when compared to other 
methodologies, we believe it is the first to actively involve user 
information in security decisions. 
Our case studies have shown that this method is well received, 
useful and approachable, having in many cases resulted in a more 
comprehensive and structured approach to security. We are 
currently expanding the number of projects we are working with 
as a result. As part of our review of AEGIS, we intend to extend 
and refine our methods in order to provide more extensive support 
for the risk analysis and security design phases. 
We envisage future work to involve identifying common security 
requirements and linking them to the appropriate security design 
patterns [2] as well as improving tool support. 
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